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Abstract 
Poor women borrow from multiple sources. This study examines whether the source of debt matters 
for women’s role in household financial decisions. Drawing on a household survey from rural Tamil 
Nadu, we categorise women’s loans along the lines of accessibility and formality into ‘planned loans’ 
and ‘instant loans’. We find that ‘instant loans’ support women’s bargaining power in various types 
of household financial decisions, whereas ‘planned loans’ have no impact. This surprising result is 
better understood when the nature of ‘instant loans’ is examined – these are frequently usurious, 
involve coercive enforcement methods and considered socially debasing. Hence women who use 
them perform a convenient role for their households and in return gain some negotiating power. 
Keywords: Debt, Women Empowerment, Microfinance, Tamil Nadu, India. 
JEL codes: G24, L26, O16, M13 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Considerable progress has been made in the last two decades toward a better understanding of poor 
people’s financial lives (Collins et al., 2009). Of special interest to researchers has been the 
borrowing behaviour of poor women. It is now well documented that poor women can have complex 
borrowing networks; where they simultaneously borrow from different sources, in different forms 
and with vastly different repayment arrangements. They may combine support from their relatives 
and friends with short term borrowing from neighbours and shopkeepers, while at the same time 
borrow from moneylenders and formal institutions (Kabeer, 1994; Johnson 2004; Salway et al. 2005; 
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Guérin 2011). Despite this detailed documentation of multiple sources of borrowing by poor women, 
when considering the impact of credit on women empowerment, research so far has only focussed on 
microfinance. Other formal and informal sources of borrowing as a possible determinant of women’s 
empowerment have been entirely ignored. Drawing on a household survey from the Indian state of 
Tamil Nadu, we seek to remedy this by investigating the role of multiple sources of women’s debt on 
their empowerment. 
Part of the reason why women may borrow from diverse sources is because of the way financial 
responsibilities are divided within the household. Irrespectively of the diversity and complexity of 
financial arrangements, intra-household financial responsibilities are generally divided along the 
gender lines (Dwyer and Bruce, 1988; Kabeer, 1994). Men and women also operate their own 
financial circuits and borrow from different sources for different purposes (Johnson, 2004; Guérin, 
2011; Agier et al. 2013). Men are typically in charge of asset management while women take care of 
expenditures in household provisioning, children’s health and education (Thomas, 1990; Senauer, 
1990; Schultz, 2001; Duflo, 2003; Chant, 2007; Garikipati, 2009). In poor households, women 
typically lack co-ownership of productive assets but are nevertheless responsible for family 
provisioning (Kabeer, 1994; da Corta and Venkateswarlu, 2005), which often means they have to 
secure small loans to balance the family budget (Dwyer and Bruce, 1988). 
Women in developing countries engage in permanent juggling between various sources of income, 
savings, loans or reciprocal gifts (Dwyer and Bruce, 1988; Ardener and Burman, 1996; Lemire, 
2001; Johnson, 2004) and India is no exception (Mencher, 1988; Harris-White and Colatei, 2004; 
Guérin, 2011). Notwithstanding amounts and costs, borrowing sources differ in many important 
aspects, notably in terms of accessibility and flexibility (Collins et al., 2009). Significantly, 
borrowing sources can also differ along social lines (Shipton, 2007; Morvant-Roux et al., 2014); 
where borrowing from sources like banks, financial institutions or the local elite can be honourable, 
while borrowing from other sources like local moneylenders and shopkeepers is degrading (Guérin et 
al., 2013). Borrowing from degrading sources is also less acceptable to men than to women – who 
borrow for different reasons anyway (Harris-White and Colatei, 2004; D’Espallier et al., 2011).  
Evidence suggests that even women’s microloans, meant for the promotion of self-employment, are 
routinely diverted into consumption (Kalpana, 2008; Garikipati, 2008a; D’Espallier et al., 2011; 
Guérin et al., 2012). In fact, Collins et al. (2009) argue that credit for consumption is a necessity in 
cash-strapped families. Such credit may also reduce women’s reproductive work burden by allowing 
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her to make time saving choices and release more time for productive work (Johnson, 2004). It is for 
these reasons that in poor households, informal credit networks are more important to women than to 
men. To some extent, the emergence of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations may be interpreted 
as a response to this ‘female burden’ imposed by male hegemony over family assets and incomes on 
the one hand, and by a disproportionate burden for family provisioning on the other (Bouman, 1977, 
1994; Ardener and Burman, 1996; Johnson, 2004). In such context, it is not surprising that access to 
multiple sources of credit is important for women.  
The link between women’s borrowing and their empowerment is heavily debated (Pitt and Khandker, 
1996; Hashemi et al. 1996; Kabeer, 2001, 2005; Holvoet, 2005; Garikipati, 2008a; Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010; Banerjee et al. 2010; Agier and Szafarz, 2013; D’Espallier, et al., 2011, 2013). This 
literature, however, focuses only on the impact of microfinance on women empowerment. As far as 
we know, there are no studies that address the issue of whether credit in general, including credit 
from informal networks, matters for women’s empowerment.  
We aim to address this gap by exploring a unique dataset from rural Tamil Nadu that is the result of 
extensive fieldwork over the five-year period, 2005-2009.  The main data comes from a household 
survey in 2008, supplemented by qualitative interviews in 2009. The earlier years were spent in 
detailed profiling of the survey region and household credit behaviour. We pay attention to all 
available sources of credit and to all types of financial decisions through which women 
empowerment possibly takes place. Following careful scrutiny, we categorise women’s borrowing 
into ‘planned loans’ and ‘instant loans’. Planned loans are taken from formal, institutional sources 
and local elites and are repaid over several months or even years. Large loans taken from friends or 
relatives may also fall into this category. In all cases of planned loans, we find that there is a formal, 
generally written, agreement in place. In contrast, instant loans are typically taken from informal 
sources, for short periods, are small in size and are available immediately with little or no paperwork. 
These loans are characterised by accessibility and informality and sourced from neighbours, friends, 
relatives, pawnbrokers, ambulant lenders and shopkeepers. Interestingly, we find that while planned 
loans are taken by both men and women, instant loans are typically secured only by women. 
With respect to financial decision making, and as expected in a patriarchal society, we find that while 
women are often responsible for everyday spending, they are less likely to have the sole control over 
decisions taken less frequently and of strategic interest to the household. Following this observation, 
we rank decisions in order of their importance to the household using objective indicators of 
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frequency and size. We separately examine the impact of women’s borrowing on each decision type. 
Our findings show that women’s borrowing does have a beneficial impact on their intra-household 
financial bargaining power – at least as much as their cash incomes. As expected, we find the impact 
to be significant for routine decisions, but we also find significant impact for decisions of strategic 
interest to the household like in matters of health and education. A disaggregated analysis reveals 
that this impact is driven solely by loans categorised as instant loans and planned loans (including 
microfinance) do not help women have a greater say in household financial decisions.  
This surprising result is better understood when we closely examine the nature of instant loans. We 
interview women borrowers and their household members to help unpick some of the possible 
reasons for this unexpected result. These interviews provide useful insights into the social hierarchy 
of debt that exists in rural India, where not all sources of loans are valued equally. Borrowing from 
formal sources like banks and the local elite is considered socially respectable, as such borrowing is 
usually for investment or asset expansion or for prestigious ceremonies.1 On the other hand, instant 
loans from informal sources for short periods of time are considered socially degrading as these are 
usually taken for immediate consumption. Women take these loans to sustain household’s 
reproductive activities and to cover for family honour. In several cases we find that instant loans are 
exploitative and lenders, especially ambulant lenders, use coercive practices to elicit compliance. 
Women, who use instant loans to provide for their families, thus perform a convenient service for 
their husbands and other household members who do not themselves borrow from these sources. The 
additional bargaining power that these women gain in their households can then be seen as a 
concession by their families for securing instant loans. Women sacrifice their social honour and 
physical safety to enable the smooth day-to-day running of their households and in return they are 
given additional bargaining powers in their household. If institutional credit aims to benefit women, 
lenders must rise to the challenge of providing loans that emulate the flexible characteristics of 
instant loans without the associated usurious and coercive conditions.2   
 
2. Data 
During the years 2005 to 2009, fieldwork was carried out in rural Tamil Nadu in South India. The 
survey focused on women belonging to Self-Help-Groups (SHGs). These groups typically gather 
twelve to twenty women who firstly circulate money among each other and later become eligible for 
external loans. They are supported by institutional credit that is insured by the National Apex Bank 
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for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD, India). SHGs are the most common modality of 
institutional lending in rural Tamil Nadu. In March 2009, of the 12 million clients served by 
microfinance institutions in rural Tamil Nadu, SHGs accounted for 62.2% of the number of 
borrowers and 62.9% of the volume of outstanding credit (Sa-Dhan, 2009). 
Data collection was done in three distinct stages in the villages of the districts of Vellore and 
Thiruvallur. First, during 2005 and 2006, semi-structured interviews with men and women were 
carried out and group discussions were organised with key informants including lenders. These were 
used to capture the nature of household budget management systems and other financial 
arrangements within the households. Specific attention was paid to gendered roles and 
responsibilities in terms of management, borrowing, saving, repayment and financial decisions. This 
qualitative stage exhibited the diversity of borrowing practices and their complex modalities. In the 
second stage, a quantitative questionnaire was developed and implemented in 2008. We used a 
stratified sampling strategy to select the sample for this phase of the fieldwork. Details are provided 
in the Appendix. We interviewed 163 married women who were members of SHGs and had 
completed at least one loan cycle with the program.3 The survey focused on household’s socio-
economic characteristics, financial decision making and financial practices. Finally, in 2009, 
qualitative fieldwork further explored the role of debt in women’s bargaining power within their 
households. Repeated visits with 15 women from different socio-economic backgrounds were carried 
out with the aim to situate the role of women’s instant borrowing within the dynamics of intra-
household power relationships.   
Table 1 gives an overview of the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, their households 
and finances. The average age of our respondents is around 35 years and 33% of the women in our 
sample are illiterate. This is despite the fact that education has improved over the recent decades in 
Tamil Nadu, especially for women (Vijayabaskar et al., 2004). A little over 31% still live in 
traditional agnatic joint family units and the average size of a household is 4.8 members, including 
1.7 children. Approximately 60% of the households are Dalits.4 Around 75% of the households are 
located around 10-30 minute bus ride from urban centres, while the rest are much more remote.   
On average, the household’s annual cash income is around 38,000 INR (850 USD) and around 12.6% 
of this income is earned by women.5 Half of the women respondents, however, have no regular 
income generating activity. Meagre household cash incomes6 are supplemented by significant (net) 
kinship support of around 16,000 INR on average per year (just over 40% of household’s cash 
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incomes).7 Almost equal support is received from the kin of the husband and wife. In addition, 
households incur significant levels of debt either to support consumption smoothing or income 
generation activities. Loans contracted during the year 2008 were in excess of 75,000 INR on 
average per household, which is around twice the annual household incomes. More than one third of 
this is classed as women’s borrowings.   
From our data it is evident that women’s role in household’s finances go well beyond earning a cash 
income only. While their contribution to household incomes is just around 12%, they are responsible 
for around 50% of support received from relatives and for over 35% of the loans that the household 
incurs. It would be fair to say that whether they are earning cash incomes or not, women in our 
sample are highly involved in family finances and a large proportion of that involvement is sustained 
via borrowing. In the next section, we learn more about women’s borrowing practices. 
<Table 1 Here> 
 
3. Women’s Borrowing Habits and the Social Hierarchy of Debt  
In the survey area, poor women tended to have complex borrowing habits – borrowing 
simultaneously from several sources and for varied reasons. From numerous deliberations with our 
respondents, we concluded that the main differences between the sources of borrowing were the 
speed of accessibility and the formality of a contract. We hence decided to categorise women’s loans 
along these lines. A fair amount of data mining preceded the categorisation of loan types into 
‘planned’ and ‘instant’.8 A loan was categorised as ‘planned’ if it was taken in a planned manner and 
there existed an explicit agreement between the contracting parties and as ‘instant’ if it was accessed 
immediately, with little or no paperwork. The average debt incurred by women in 2008 was 28,555 
INR. Of this, 19,838 INR (69.5%) was planned and the remainder 8,717 INR (30.5%) was of the 
instant type. Both categories are made up of loans from various sources. Table 2 provides a quick 
overview of the terms and conditions attached to each of the loan sources. 
‘Planned loans’ are usually sizeable amounts of money, incurred for long periods and often for 
investment purposes; mainly agricultural business investment, but also social investments like 
marriage and education. The essential elements of these loans are their planned nature and the 
presence of a contract – usually a written one. The most common form of planned loans is provided 
by the local elites who are seeking to invest their surplus incomes. Although a contractual 
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arrangement is in place and collateral may be required, trust is the main condition in such contracts 
(also observed by Harriss-White and Colatei, 2004; Swaminathan, 1991). The other planned loan 
types include formal sources like banks and private financial companies. Large amounts borrowed 
from neighbours, friends and relatives may also sometimes require a more formal agreement between 
the parties. It was typically for men to incur planned loans, but women are increasingly involved in 
terms of sharing the repayment burden and also being the named person in contracts.  
‘Instant loans’ are sourced informally; the amount of money involved is usually small and for a 
shorter period of time (generally days or weeks). Instant loans are mainly intended for immediate 
consumption. Accessibility is primarily valued but there is also less formality around these loans – 
little paperwork and virtually no formal contract. In practice, instant loans gather several specific 
sources of loans: kaimathu, thandal, loans from pawnbroker, shopkeepers, friends and family. 
Kaimathu literally means “exchange money from hand to hand”. It refers to very small loans from 
neighbours, with zero interest and implicit reciprocity. Thandal means “immediate” and represents 
small to medium loans from mobile lenders who bring cash and collect repayments at the door step. 
Thandal is typically a few thousand rupees given for around 3 months. Interest charged is quite high 
– in the range of 10 to 15% per month. Pawnbroker loans are another frequently used option. Almost 
any asset can be pledged, but gold in the form of jewellery is the most common. The loan amount 
depends on the item pledged. Pawnbroker loans are normally of one year duration and interest rates 
charged are around 2 to 3% per month. Village corner shops and grocery stores in nearby towns also 
offer rapid credit with easy terms. Typically, households are able to buy groceries and pay later 
without additional charges. Shopkeepers would generally offer such credit because they are familiar 
with the woman and her household and are confident about repayment. What matters in such cases is 
not the individual woman, but the overall creditworthiness of the family. 
Importantly, women in our survey categorised SHG loans as a planned loan. In practice, SHGs are 
micro-banks composed of fifteen to twenty people (only women in our study) who manage two types 
of loans: internal loans based on members’ savings and external loans provided by banks. Price is the 
main advantage of SHG loans: with a monthly interest rate of 1.5 to 2%. However the length of the 
procedure and its rigidity are major weaknesses. For internal loans, SHG members have to wait for 
the monthly meeting and potential borrowers never know in advance whether their demand will be 
accepted. For external loans, procedures are not only protracted but also unreliable as SHGs grant 
individual loans based on fund availability, but also on the group’s evaluation of the requests. 
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Another significant observation of our fieldwork is that women play an important role in instant 
loans. This is especially true when it comes to reciprocal exchanges with neighbours, transactions 
with shopkeepers in the village and ambulant lenders at their doorstep. At least partly, this is because 
the main purpose of instant loans is to cope with income smoothing, and small emergencies which is 
typically a female responsibility. Men do not want to bother with the ‘domestic task’ of household 
management. Day-to-day management of the household is clearly seen as a ‘women’s little 
problems’ and women are simply expected to get on with these. In the words of one of our male 
focus group participants “…women are best at sorting out these little annoyances” (Murali, age 43). 
Men also avoid getting involved in such loans because it is a matter of honour and status.9 It would 
be considered degrading for a man to ask neighbours and shopkeepers for a few hundred rupees to 
smooth out matters of daily survival. Borrowing large sums is a source of pride and reputation – an 
indicator of social prestige. In contrast borrowing small amounts is degrading, especially when it 
takes place in the neighbourhood – it suggests a lack of ability to run one’s household. Explaining 
how degrading borrowing small amounts would be for her husband Parvati (age 35) explains: 
“…men do not want to be disturbed by small expenses. He has a good position, he cannot beg like 
this. People will say: ‘what sort of earning he has’, ‘what sort of man he is’. Even if he wanted to go, 
I won’t let him, it is also a matter of status for me”. Parvati herself borrows from multiple informal 
lenders, suggesting that it is more acceptable for wives to take such loans, but husbands’ doing the 
same is closely associated with loss of family honour.   
The profile of instant loan lenders also contributes to the observed social hierarchy among sources of 
debt. Borrowing from ambulant lenders, in particular, is seen as the most degrading practice, 
reserved only for women and Dalits (also see Harriss-White and Colatei 2004; Guérin et al. 2013). 
Though ambulant lenders are often the only way to address emergencies, they are the last resort, 
because they are expensive, but also because of the lack of respect shown by these lenders. They 
come to the household’s doorsteps, precluding any form of discretion. They do not request any 
collateral but use coercive enforcement methods. The ambulant lenders we interviewed themselves 
state that women are more prepared to tolerate abusive language from them and are more responsive 
to such treatment. It is also the reason why they prefer dealing with women. In some cases ambulant 
lenders behaved so badly that households had barred the women from using them. One of our 
respondents, Sandhya (age 27), told us about how her husband accused her of exposing herself to bad 
men “…from what kind of men you borrow?” She was explicitly stopped from borrowing for a while 
and now she goes for so-called “safe lending” – only from lenders known to the family.  
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Evidence also suggests that women are excluded from certain types of institutional loans. Such 
exclusions apply at several levels – not only gender, but class and caste also matter (Harriss-White 
and Colatei 2004; Swaminathan 1991; Guérin et al. 2013). One of our respondents, Saraswathi (age 
43), is a Dalit who relates her experience of giving up on a bank loan for 30,000 rupees after having 
tried for nearly two months. She describes the slowness, complexity but also unfairness of the 
procedure. “If you want 10 paisa from the bank, you’ll lose 10 inches of your legs”, she says, 
referring to the multiple trips she made to the bank. She went over a dozen times and each time the 
paperwork was not acceptable and she was asked for new certificates (certificate of residence, 
guarantor certificate and so on). There were also institutional barriers that are perhaps embedded in 
gender – she knew she had to bribe the clerk and the cashier but did not know how to approach them. 
She relates the contrasting experience of a man from her village (from a different caste) who told her 
about this loan scheme: “He got it within 10 days, without any certificate. Why do you think he got it 
in 10 days, without giving any certificate, while I have to go round and round?” she questions. 
We thus witness a distinct ‘social hierarchy of debt’ – where loans get associated with a social status 
depending on their source, size and purpose. Instant loans from informal sources, for small amounts 
of money and for immediate consumptions are assigned a lowly status in this social order. 
Furthermore, we witness a ‘feminisation’ of such debt – where women negotiate their families out of 
routine expenditures and have to withstand the insults and sullies that are part of such borrowing.     
That said, the importance of instant loans for women cannot be understated. Instant loans constitute 
over 30% of women’s borrowings and given that they are borrowed for different reasons than 
planned loans – they may impact women in different ways. Given that instant loans are mainly taken 
for consumption needs – it is reasonable to hypothesise that instant loans help women have a role in 
routine consumption decisions but may not help her have a say household’s strategic investment 
decisions. This may be better done by planned loans. For these reasons, examining the differential 
impact of planned and instant loans on women’s role in financial decisions is significant.  
<Table 2 Here> 
 
4. A Measure of Women Empowerment 
There is significant debate around the measurement of women empowerment (for an overview see 
Malhotra et al. 2002). Whilst recognising its multidimensional quality, we focus on just one aspect of 
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women empowerment, namely: women’s role in financial decision-making. Two reasons justify this 
choice. First, for the sake of result comparability; we favour this indicator as it is widely used in the 
literature (Kabeer 2001; Hashemi et al. 2005; Holvoet, 2005; Garikipati, 2008a). Second, the 
respondents themselves validated this choice by acknowledging that participation in financial 
decision-making is a sign of respect and recognition by their family.  
From our fieldwork it was also apparent that not all financial decisions were valued equally. Some 
reflect social norms and pre-existing gender division of roles and responsibilities. For instance, the 
purchase of daily items (food) were typical female responsibility, while strategic life choices 
(children education’s and social ceremonies) fell within the male and in-laws’ traditional arenas of 
decision-making (also see Kabeer, 2001). Using first-stage qualitative analysis, we identify four 
types of financial decisions that households make. We used focus group discussions to rank these 
decisions from routine, day-to-day ones to those considered more strategic to the household and 
hence more prestigious. We arrive at the following ranking (ordered from the most routine to the 
most strategic): routine, health, children’s education, and social ceremonies. Some typical examples 
of household financial decisions within each category from the fieldwork are presented in Table 3. 
We used the two benchmarks of ‘regularity’ and ‘predictability’ in classifying specific decisions. If a 
decision was taken regularly (daily or weekly) and was expected by the household – then it was 
considered ‘routine’. If a decision was taken only occasionally (irregularly, biannually or annually) 
and/or was unexpected and could not be prepared for in advance then it was classed as non-routine 
and was classified under another relevant category. In addition, any expense that was in excess of 
300 rupees was also classed as non-routine. We arrived at this cut-off after discussions with several 
focus group participants. Excluding emergencies, expenses in excess of 300 were typically of 
strategic interest to the household – one that involved a fair level of planning. Participating in such 
decisions was considered quite important within the household.  
Respondent were asked to describe own involvement in each type of decision. Answers were coded 
into one of the three options: (0) has little or no role in the decision which is made entirely by other 
member(s) of the household; (1) decides jointly with other member(s) of the household; (2) makes 
the decisions alone. Figure 1 summarizes the responses of the 163 married women respondents. It 
shows that women in our survey are actively involved in household’s financial decisions. Depending 
on the issue at stake, they are seen to decide, alone or jointly, in 65% to 75% of the cases – which is a 
notable outcome – many are also seen to make decisions alone (25% to 55%). For routine decisions, 
we find that if the woman respondent report as having no role, it is generally another (older) woman 
11 
	
in the household who has responsibility for it.10 However, the more strategic the decision, the less 
likely that women would be consulted or be the sole decision maker. For instance, in around 35% of 
the cases women have no say in health and educational expenses and in around 25% of the cases they 
are not consulted about social ceremonies. The household member(s) who make decisions in such 
cases is typically the husband, but also the parents-in-law. In the case of decisions around 
ceremonies, it is notable that in just a little over 50% of the cases women are involved in the 
decision. Because of the nature of social ceremonies (see Table 3), these decisions are typically 
drawn-out, involving much discussion and planning within the family. In this process, it is 
unsurprising that women have a role, similar to other members of the family.     
The different consideration given to routine versus non-routine financial decisions was a theme that 
kept recurring in our focus group interviews. One of our focus group participants Rajeswari (age 54) 
lives with her son’s family. When asked whether her daughter-in-law, who looks after the day-to-day 
affairs of the household, is involved in big financial decisions – her response is extremely clear: 
“How do you want her to decide these things? She has no idea, she is not capable...”  
It was evident that women recognised the difference in the importance attached to routine versus 
strategic decisions and felt considerable pride when they participated in financial decisions that are of 
strategic interest to the household. Parvati (age 42) is one such respondent, she has no regular income 
but she manages household budget and participates in all major financial decisions. She also explains 
that she struggled a lot with her husband to educate her handicapped daughter: “I told him I am the 
pillar of the family, you earn money but my hands are safer, (and) at the end he got convinced.”  
Furthermore, it was evident that women who make non-routine financial decisions for their 
households on their own wield a considerable level of control and authority within their households. 
Rajam (age 48) who has the sole responsibility for all major decisions in her household tells us: “I 
am the back bone of the family and if I stop functioning then the family will suffer. They know this. 
All of sudden if I close my eyes then the whole family is in dark”. Describing the way she takes 
decisions – she tells us that she decides and lets the family know about it. She is confident of their 
consent. Interestingly, Rajam does not bother with most of the routine tasks in the household – which 
are managed by her daughter-in-law. 
From this survey experience, we draw two significant conclusions. First, there is a clear 
differentiation in the importance attached to various types of financial decisions within the 
households. Women with a role in non-routine financial decisions are seen to enjoy a better status 
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within their households when compared to those with no role in such decisions. It would therefore be 
inappropriate to merge all decisions in one single measure or to assume an underlying relationship 
between them. Instead, we separately consider women’s role in each type of decision and the various 
factors that help or hinder her role in making that decision. Second, women with the authority to 
make decisions on their own are clearly different from those who decide jointly with others in their 
household. It would be interesting to capture the differences in the experiences of women who wield 
different levels of power in their households. We attempt to do this by assigning an order to women’s 
role in decision making. Women who take decisions on their own are ranked highest in this order, 
followed by women who decide jointly with others in the household and finally women with no role.   
<Table 3 Here> 
<Figure 1 Here> 
 
5. Does the Type of Credit Matter for Women’s Empowerment?  
In this section, we examine the determinants of women’s empowerment as measured by their role in 
household financial decisions. We test two main hypotheses. First, that woman’s borrowing matters, 
along with other sources of cash, household and personal characteristics. Our second hypothesis is 
that all sources of borrowing do not matter equally, more specifically we expect to see planned loans 
and instant loans influence decision making in different ways.  
Before we proceed to analyse our field data however, it is important to consider if it suffers from 
sample selection bias. Typically, selection problem occurs because the inherent differences between 
women who select to access credit and those who don’t are also likely to influence the empowerment 
variable. If these differences are ignored, it may lead to statistical results that are exaggerated or even 
misleading. In this study, the selection problem we need to consider is slightly different. As we are 
interested in comparing the differential impact of planned loans and instant loans on women 
empowerment, the inherent differences between women accessing these types of loans has 
implications for our analysis. Women who access planned loans may be more outgoing, more 
entrepreneurial and have better negotiating skills when compared to those who rely on small instant 
loans. These differences may have implications for empowerment – which is of interest to us. The 
problem of course is that these inherent differences cannot be observed directly. We can however 
deduce potential selection issues by comparing the two groups of women along the variables that can 
be observed; as these differences can give us an insight into differences in inherent nature. However, 
given the nature of our data, a straightforward comparison between women who access planned loans 
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and those who access instant loans is not possible. All the women in our sample are SHG clients who 
have completed at least one loan cycle. SHG loans constitute the biggest share of all planned loans. 
And nearly all women also take instant loans of one type or the other. Given these data limitations, 
the only meaningful comparison we can make is between women who rely more on planned loans 
and women who rely more on instant loans. We carry out an independent samples t-test to compare 
personal and household characteristics of women who borrow more from planned sources (97) and 
women who borrow more from instant sources (49). For this part of the analysis we exclude 17 
women who borrow equal or very similar amounts of planned and instant loans. 
Table 4 reports the p-value associated with the t-test. The p-value indicates the probability of seeing 
the difference we find in the two samples if there is really no difference in the population. Generally, 
if the p-value is below 0.05 (5%), we can conclude that the observed difference is not down to 
chance and that there is a statistically significant difference between the two population means. Using 
the sample median as a cut-off point, we fist compare women whose total borrowing (planned + 
instant) is below or equal to the median borrowing and women whose total borrow is above the 
median. These comparisons suggest that there are some differences between these two groups of 
women: women who borrow above the median are older, live in less remote areas and their 
household’s enjoy greater support from husband’s kin. Comparing women who rely more on planned 
loans and those who rely more on instant loans also reveals some differences between these groups, 
but these differences are mainly in household characteristics. Specifically, women who rely more on 
planned loans tend to have larger families, suggesting greater need for credit. They are also more 
likely to belong to non-Dalit households with significantly better access to resources like land and 
income. This suggests that despite the achievements in the area of inclusive credit, structural barriers 
like caste and class continue to hinder access to institutional credit in rural India. This also matches 
with the qualitative evidence from our fieldwork (see Section 3). Women who rely on instant loans, 
on the other hand are likely to belong to Dalit households that are significantly poorer but enjoy 
greater external ties and live in less remote areas. These differences fit in with our field observations 
that instant loans are more likely to be accessed by poorer households. Poor households in more 
accessible areas are also likely to be the target of marketing strategies adopted by ambulant lenders. 
The ability to borrow instantly also relies on how well the household is known to people in the 
community as trust and reciprocity, rather than physical assets, are the main collaterals in such loans. 
Lenders are prepared to lend to women because they know the family well and are not only 
guaranteed repayment but also the family’s goodwill and continued patronage. Swaminathan (1991), 
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and Harriss-White and Colatei (2004) make similar observations for elsewhere in rural India where 
credit to individuals is based on familial reputation and long term goodwill.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
These comparisons suggest that while there are some differences between women who rely more on 
planned loans when compared to those who rely on instant loans – these differences are by and large 
at the household level.11 In particular, we find that women from poor, but well connected Dalit 
households are more likely to access instant loans. Despite there being no systematic evidence to 
suggest a serious selection problem, when interpreting our results, we will need to be mindful of 
these differences between the two groups of women.    
Following these comparisons, we regress women’s role in financial decisions on borrowing and other 
explanatory variables related to individual characteristics.12 Given our earlier observation that routine 
and non-routine decisions are inherently different, we consider a woman’s role in each decision type 
separately.13 Using the earlier classification of decision types we estimate four models: Routine; 
Health; Education and Ceremonies. In addition to women’s borrowing, we include three categories of 
explanatory variables: woman’s personal characteristics; household characteristics and variables on 
household finances. For descriptive statistics see Table 1 and Table 4.  
With respect to woman’s personal characteristics, we expect age, education and number of children 
to have a positive coefficient. Age is associated with experience and this may render older women 
with greater agency in household decisions. Education is associated with better decision making 
ability as these may involve basic literacy and numeracy skills; hence educated women can be 
expected to have a greater role in decisions. Further, women who have been through the enduring 
experiences of child bearing and rearing may also be given a greater role in household decisions, 
especially if these decisions affect their children. With respect to household characteristics, we 
consider the size of the household, whether or not it is a Dalit household, whether it is a joint or a 
nuclear family set up, the external ties enjoyed by the household, the material used to construct the 
house and whether it is remotely rural. We have no a priori expectations on the relationship these 
variables are likely to have with woman’s decision making power.  
Finally, with respect to household’s finances, we expect other’s income, support received from 
husband’s kin and husband’s borrowing to have a negative coefficient. These variables relate to the 
level of financial contribution others make to the household and the expectation is that the more other 
members contribute, the less say woman will have in household decisions. Conversely, we expect 
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woman’s income, support from her kin and her borrowing to have a positive coefficient because 
these variables relate to the extent of contribution she makes to the household economy.    
Following the discussion in Section 4, we assign an order to our dependent variable: woman’s role in 
financial decision.14 Within each decision type, we consider women who take the decision on their 
own as the most empowered, followed by women who take the decision in consultation with others 
and finally women who have no role in the decision and hence the least empowered. Given that our 
dependent variable is ordered – the appropriate theoretical model is the ordered probit model 
(Greene, 2000). Heuristically speaking, the ordered probit technique is a generalisation of the linear 
model to cases where the dependent variable is discrete and takes only a finite number of values 
possessing a natural ordering (Hausmann et al., 1991). An advantage of ordered probit is that unlike 
linear regression, it allows for unequal shifts between ordinal categories in the dependent variable. 
Thus, for example, it does not assume that the difference between the likelihood of having no role in 
the decision and having a joint role has the same magnitude as the difference between the likelihood 
of having a joint role and an independent role, given a unit change in the explanatory variable. Here 
the ordered probit captures the differences between the likelihood of different levels of female 
involvement in the decision.  
The analysis assumes a latent continuous variable E∗ (women empowerment) that is a linear function 
of observed explanatory variables. Although we cannot observe E∗, it is related to an observed 
discrete variable E coded as 0, 1, 2, whose realisations are determined by the relative position of E∗. 
The ordered probit uses the following form which is built around the following linear relationship: E∗ = β′x+ ϵ                                                    (1) 
where E∗ is the latent variable; β′ is the vector parameters to be estimated and x is the vector of 
explanatory variables which include woman’s borrowing and her personal characteristics; ϵ is the 
error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. The observed data on women’s role in 
household’s financial decision, E are related to the underlying latent variable E∗ through thresholds 
µ!and µ!. A women falls in no role if E∗ < µ!, in joint role if µ! < E∗ < µ! and independent role 
above µ! < E∗.We have the following probabilities for a woman to fall in each category: Prob E = 0 =  Φ(µ! − β′x)          Prob E = 1 =  Φ(µ! − β′x)− Φ(µ! − β′x)                           
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Prob E = 2 = 1−  Φ(µ! − β′x)                                                                                                       (2) 
where µ! < µ! are defined as the two thresholds between which the probability of the three 
categorical responses are estimated. A likelihood function can be derived making the estimation of 
this model relatively simple. Ordered probit estimation will give the thresholds µ and parameters β. 
The thresholds  µ show the cut in the latent variable that make the dependent variable E shift from no 
role (0) to joint role (1) and from joint role (1) to independent role (2). The remaining parameters, β, 
represent the effect of changes in explanatory variables on the latent variable. The marginal effects of 
factors x on the propensity for women to fall in each level of decision can be derived in this way: ∂Prob(E = 0) ∂x = − Φ µ! − β′x β              ∂Prob(E = 1) ∂x = − Φ µ! − β′x − Φ µ! − β′x β              ∂Prob(E = 2) ∂x = Φ µ! − β′x β                                                                                                  (3)      
with Φ the probability density and Φ the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. 
Computation of marginal effects is particularly meaningful for the ordered probit model whereas the 
effect of variables x on the intermediate categories is ambiguous with only the parameter estimates.  
The estimated coefficients for each of the decision types are presented in Table 5. All results show a 
positive effect of woman’s borrowing on her role in household financial decisions – irrespective of 
the decision type. The effect is strong and significant in two of the four regressions, Health and 
Education, but not in regressions Routine and Ceremonies.  
With respect to other explanatory variables, the noteworthy results are for the variables Age, 
Children, Dalit and Women’s Income. The coefficient for Age is negative and significant in the 
regression Routine and positive and significant in the regression Education – suggesting that older 
women are less likely to have a role in routine decisions but more likely to be involved in strategic 
decisions concerning children’s education. This corresponds well with our qualitative findings which 
suggest that older women delegate routine decisions to younger women in the family. The coefficient 
for Children is positive and significant in the regressions Health, Education and Ceremonies – 
suggesting that if a woman has children then she is more likely to have a role in these decisions. Dalit 
has a negative and significant coefficient in the regressions Routine and Health – suggesting that 
being a Dalit is likely to negatively influence woman’s role in these decisions. Finally, the results for 
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woman’s income show that having an independent income positively influences her ability to make 
routine decisions and decisions related to children’s education.     
Taken together, these results imply that, after controlling for personal and household characteristics 
and other sources of financial support received by the household, woman’s role in financial decisions 
is positively influenced by her borrowing. This influence, moreover, is significant for decisions on 
health and education. These decisions mostly affect children; suggesting that woman’s borrowing 
may enable her to influence health and educational outcomes for her children.  
A key issue for this paper is whether loans taken instantly for consumption purposes affect women’s 
power in different ways than planned loans that are more deliberately incurred. In the first round of 
estimations we did not differentiate between the different types of borrowing that women access. We 
do this next. Table 6 presents estimated coefficients on all four decision types, while separately 
considering the impact of planned and instant loans.  
In a surprising turn of events, we find that women’s planned loans do not impact their role in 
household financial decisions. The coefficient of women’s planned borrowing is even negative in the 
regression for routine decisions. Women’s instant borrowing, on the other hand, is seen to have a 
positive effect on their role in household decisions. The effect is strong and significant in three of the 
four regressions, the exception being Ceremonies. The results on the remaining explanatory variables 
remain much as before. Our results remain robust to an increase in women’s age and income by 5%. 
A 10% change in income alters the significance of some of the material variables, but not the sign.  
Given that all the surveyed women are members of SHGs and these loans make up a large proportion 
of women’s planned borrowings, it can be argued that there may not be enough variation in the data 
to capture the impact of planned borrowings. Two points are worth considering here. First, over 30% 
of planned loans come from various other sources (see Table 2). Second, even within the SHG loans 
there is a fair amount of variation in the amount of money women receive (Mean: 14108.28; SD: 
26730.47). This is mainly down to the autonomy that groups have over loan disbursement among 
members. Groups may choose to distribute loans equally among all members or rotationally. Whilst 
these decisions are taken by the group collectively, they are not directly in the control of any 
individual woman (hence selection problem is less of a worry).   
For planned and instant loans we calculate the marginal effects (the change in the probability of an 
outcome from a unit change in the explanatory variable). All other covariates are set at the means of 
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the relevant sample for the calculations. Table 7 shows the marginal effects from ordered probit 
models for women’s role in household’s financial decisions. As before, we consider three different 
probabilities: she has no role; she has a joint role and she is able to take these decisions alone. Given 
the structure of the ordered probit, these effects will sometimes be inversely related: any variable that 
has a positive effect on women’s role in a household decision will increase the probability of women 
making decisions alone, but may reduce the probability of women having a joint role in a decision. 
The absolute values of the marginal effect can differ from probability to probability – because these 
also depend on the threshold parameters estimated by the ordered probit model. Although the 
magnitudes of the marginal effect are minute, once again, we find that instant loans are likely to 
significantly increase women’s power to make decisions alone and reduce the likelihood of having 
no role or a joint role in decisions. This impact is consistent across three of the four decision types.  
These results suggest that while instant loans seem to help women have a greater role in household 
financial decisions – planned loans do not seem to have a similar impact. Specifically, we find that 
instant loans help women have a say in routine decisions and decisions related to health and 
education expenditures. This seemingly paradoxical result is even more surprising when we consider 
that instant loans constitute just 30% of women’s borrowing and are largely made up of small loans, 
accessed for short periods of time; whereas planned loans are large loans meant for investments and 
asset expansion. What this suggests, is that small and short term loans that can be accessed quickly 
matter more for women’s bargaining power than large and long term loans. These unexpected results 
call for an in depth study of the context and practices surrounding the use of instant loans. Below we 
present findings from interviews with women borrowers and their family members that help explore 
the causalities underpinning these results.    
<Table 4 Here> 
<Table 5 Here> 
<Table 6 Here> 
<Table 7 Here> 
 
6. Addressing Causality 	
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Our results linking instant loans and women’s empowerment are in themselves interesting as they 
bring to light a previously undetected association. However, moving beyond correlations and 
theorising about causal relationships with cross-sectional data only is far more ambitious. To provide 
insights into the complex issue of causality, we exploit qualitative data analysis. 
We hypothesize that the causality is in the direction of instant credit influencing women’s ability to 
participate in household’s financial decisions. The possibility of reverse causality - where more 
empowered women could have procured instant loans – is unlikely. Indeed, instant loans are 
debasing and can hardly be the consequence of pre-existing empowerment. Woman of pre-existing 
status and power would not willingly seek instant loans. This claim is corroborated by our data 
which suggests that instant loans are more prevalent among women from poorer, Dalit households 
(see Table 4). Poorer women from the lowest social stratum are least likely to exert an influence over 
household decisions.15  
To further document causality, we take advantage of our qualitative surveys and discuss the 
observations under three broad points: instant loans as women’s obligation, their socially debasing 
nature and their suitability to meet household’s reproductive needs. In essence, we contend that 
women seek socially debasing instant loans out of compulsion to meet their household obligations, 
but they are later rewarded for this by means of greater role in decision-making.  
 
6.1. Instant loans are women’s obligation                                                                                    
There are several reasons why the practice of instant borrowing is embedded in the lives of poor rural 
women in the survey area. Uncertain incomes, increased female responsibility for family 
provisioning, male inability to provide for the household coupled with reluctance to engage in instant 
borrowing leaves women with little choice but to seek out sources of instant borrowing. Since the 
day-to-day running of the household is generally considered a woman’s “headache”– they have little 
choice but to use multiple financial tools to adjust income and expenses, both to make ends meet on a 
daily basis, but also to cope with unexpected and incidental expenses.  
In a male focus group, we asked about why women were the only ones who procured these loans. 
Some men used the English word “adjustment” to describe the ability that wives possess that 
enabled them in the daily running of the household – something they readily acknowledge men 
simply cannot do. Ramesh (age 34) describes how his wife goes about ‘adjusting’ finances to meet 
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family needs. “The moment I think about it, she gets the money”, explains Ramesh. “My mother gets 
sick, she will pledge her jewels, my bike needs to be repaired, and she will get help from friends, 
children need to go to school, she will arrange for the bus pass”. Praising her for borrowing small 
amounts of money without involving other members of the family, he further claims that wives must 
“...borrow quickly, without disturbing the other household members – especially their husbands”.  
Women also recognise that they are mainly responsible for “adjustments” required to run a 
household and associate this with a “burden”. Parvati (age, 42), who borrows from multiple sources, 
complaints about the injustice of gender responsibilities “Women shoulder all the responsibilities, 
they have to deal with family problems in any situation, Men find no solution. They just consume 
alcohol and sleep.” The reason why women are prepared to put up with the task of getting small 
loans is because it enables them to have a say in the financial decision at stake. Without these loans, 
they realise that the opportunity to make a particular decision may be denied to them – simply down 
to financial constraints. Parvati (age 42) has no regular income but she manages household budget 
and participates in most financial decisions. She explains, “giving 100 rupees to my husband for his 
petrol gives me more respect than finding 10,000 rupees for a big expense. You know, men do not 
want to be disturbed by small expenses.” She explains that she uses this as an opportunity to bargain: 
“It is a give and take policy. I solve a problem, and then I can ask for something”. She also explains 
how she convinced her husband to educate their handicapped daughter (also see Section 4).  
Our evidence suggests that women are compelled to incur instant borrowing to meet the reproductive 
needs of their households. These loans may in turn enable women to manoeuvre a bargaining space 
for herself that she uses to further her say in routine matters, also in matters of health and education 
of her children. Instant loans do not seem to influence women’s say in matters of ceremonial 
expenses. We find that this is because ceremonial expenses are very different in nature from the 
typical health and education expenses. The latter are typically unexpected and incidental, and hence 
are more likely to be provisioned either from family savings or from instant borrowing. Ceremonial 
expenses, on the other hand, are known beforehand and typically also involve far larger amounts. 
These expenses are much more likely to be planned and arranged by the family, sometimes well in 
advance. This explains why instant loans do not help women have a greater say in such decisions.  
 
6.2. Instant loans are socially debasing  
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The interviews with our respondents unequivocally established the fact that taking instant loans was 
considered socially debasing. Borrowing from the crudely behaved ambulant lender was degrading 
indeed, but it was also not honourable to borrow from the seemingly well behaved shopkeepers. Such 
borrowing is almost like “begging”, says Parvati (age 42). The repayment burden on women is also 
crushing. The family takes little responsibility in repaying these loans – as they are either “too 
small” for them to be concerned or they are “her loans”, explains Ramesh (age 34).  
Some ambulant lenders can use extremely nasty coercive measures – not only using severely abusive 
language but also show no hesitation in physical abuse, in some cases even beating women. Our 
evidence suggests that women also experience varying degrees of sexual abuse, ranging from vulgar 
language to crudely being touched in their private parts. In the absence of physical collateral, 
ambulant lenders see this as their only enforcement mechanism. Recollecting some of these 
experiences, Parvati (age 42) tells us how on the day of mobile lender repayments, she has stomach 
cramps. “It’s like husbands, their mood is unpredictable”. Giving a similar account of lender’s 
behaviour Rajam (age 48) tries to take a more balanced view, “…(borrowing) is like a family 
member, who gives both happiness and sorrow, just like your husband, he may love you, but he may 
also beat you”. She further acknowledges that everyone in her household relies on her for small 
amounts of cash on a frequent basis and that she can never do without these loans.  
So it seems that instant loans are a boon and a bane for these women – they must take them to meet 
the reproductive needs of their family, but equally taking these loans means they must endure a level 
of social degradation. Women, it seems, perform a convenient role for their husbands and households 
by taking on the burden for these loans. Women’s greater role in decisions here may not indicate 
greater empowerment but a mere concession by her family in return for women’s role in securing an 
instant loan and saving other family members the humiliation of incurring it.16  Even this concession, 
it seems, extends to only small, incidental expenses. Large, strategic expenses like ceremonies still 
remain well within the patriarchal domain of the household.   
 
6.3. Instant loans are designed to meet household’s reproductive needs   
By design, instant loans are more effective in helping women meet household’s reproductive needs 
and by extension, are more suited to help women have a greater role in household decisions. The 
main characteristics that set apart instant loans from planned loans are: ease of access, small size and 
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short term. Instant loans are accessed within the community, mostly from people known to the 
women and their households. Shopkeepers extend credit only because women regularly buy from 
their shops, neighbours give small amounts of money to women because they know they can rely on 
them in turn and ambulant lender may not be respectful, but they would lend without any conditions. 
Moreover, women can get these loans at very short notices – and this is the key to them having a role 
in household’s decisions. A situation related to us by one of our survey respondents (Ramesh, age 
34) is useful to make this point clearly. At the start of the school term, his household was faced with 
the problem of paying for the children’s school bus pass. His wife immediately got a small loan and 
solved the problem and they managed to send their children to school. It is very likely that, next time, 
when a decision involving children’s education comes up, Ramesh will involve his wife. This ability 
to be involved in decisions is down to the woman securing instant loans. Planned loans cannot 
influence this ability due to their rigid and nepotistic nature.  
Women, in general, find it difficult to access loans from formal lenders. Apart from SHG loans, 
which deliberately target women without any specific conditions, planned loans are not easily 
available to women. Those that are available, impose several conditions – which most women cannot 
fulfil. Because most planned loans are for large amounts of money and are associated with some 
prestige – they need the applicant to have some social status, either in term of asset ownership or in 
terms of knowing important people in the community. Planned loans typically require some collateral 
and some form of introduction: someone introduces you to the bank manager and implicitly becomes 
a guarantor to your loan. Women generally lack such pre-existing economic and social “power” and 
this may at least partly explain why they are excluded from most planned loans – especially very 
large amounts. Further, large planned loans require spatial mobility – as many big lenders live 
outside the village. Several women (and their families) are reluctant to (let them) travel outside their 
village to get loans – as this may tarnish their reputations. Women being humiliated by informal 
lenders within the community, it seems, is much more acceptable to families than unknown dangers 
that women may face if they leave their village to borrow.   
 
7. Concluding Comments  
Research so far has ignored the impact of borrowing from informal networks on women 
empowerment. We address this gap by drawing on household survey data from rural South India. 
Our results suggest that instant credit is a significant part of poor women’s loan portfolio (around 
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30%) and they influence women’s intra-household bargaining power. Women who access instant 
loans are able to exert influence on routine financial decisions as well as decisions pertaining to 
health and education of their children. In contrast, planned loans do not exert such influence on 
women’s role in financial decisions. This unexpected result is even more surprising when we 
consider that instant loans are general very small and mainly incurred to meet the consumption needs 
of the household. On the other hand, women usually take larger planned loans for productive 
investment with the expectation to improve their livelihoods.  
Exploring the true nature of instant loans enables us to understand why they might help women have 
a greater say in household’s financial decisions. Our findings suggest that there exists a social 
hierarchy of debt in rural South India. Borrowing instantly, whether it is from the vulgar ambulant 
lenders or friendly shopkeepers is not considered socially honourable. Indeed, we find that women 
experience severe verbal and physical humiliation at the hands of some informal lenders. We find 
that men rarely borrow from informal sources as their humiliation in a social sphere is more closely 
associated with family honour. We also find that women are structurally embedded to instant debt. 
Their increased responsibility for day-to-day family provisioning coupled with high income volatility 
means borrowing from informal sources is almost a daily necessity that women cannot escape. 
Household members are found to actively rely on women’s ability to borrow instantly. By accessing 
instant loans and by bearing the brunt of the social humiliation associated with such loans, women 
perform a convenient service for their households. The greater role that these women have in 
household financial decisions can then be explained as a concession by their families in return.  
Despite the negative associations, we find that instant loans are very important for women. They are 
instantly accessible with little paperwork, are small enough for individuals to manage and are 
typically short termed with flexible repayment conditions. It is for these reasons that women continue 
to rely on these loans. Herein lies a lesson for financial institutions that may enable them to design 
products that help women meet their responsibility towards routine household provisioning. By 
reducing the constant burden that women face of meeting their reproductive responsibilities, such 
loans are also likely to alleviate the constraints they face in making successful use of enterprise loans 
(Johnson, 2004). More instantly available loans or more flexible financial products are unlikely, 
however, to “empower” women in a fundamental sense. At most they are likely to help them better 
negotiate their position within a structural framework that remains largely unchanged. The danger is 
that it may even reinforce the gendered division of responsibilities. One of the main challenges of the 
financial industry is to ensure that products designed for women do not entrench them in subordinate 
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positions by responding only to practical needs identified through market research. Changing the 
structural framework that entrenches women remains the real challenge and credit alone is unlikely 
to help. Within its limited scope, however, microloans can be useful by being accessible and by the 
design of loan contracts that are more effective in supporting women’s empowerment. 
 
 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Summary Statistics (N=163, data from the year 2008) 
Variable Name Description Mean 
(SD) 
Minimum Maximum 
Women’s personal characteristics 
Age Women’s age in years 35.38 
(9.09) 
18 55 
Education Women’s level of education. 0 = never been to 
school; 1 = primary; 2 = secondary.  
0.90 
(0.74) 
0 2 
Children Number of children below the age of 15 1.75 
(0.79) 
0 4 
Household characteristics 
Size  Number of members in the family 4.79 
(1.46) 
2 11 
Dalit Dummy variable. 0 = non-Dalit; 1 = Dalit 0.60 
(0.49) 
0 1 
Joint Dummy variable. 0 = Nuclear family; 1 = Joint family 0.33 
(0.47) 
0 1 
External ties The external social ties enjoyed by the household  8.69 
(7.55) 
0 41 
Land Farm land owned by the household in acres1 0.46 
(0.83) 
0 6 
Housing Type of materials used to construct the house – 
ranging from 0 = all temporary to 4 = all permanent2 
2.09 
(1.35) 
0 4 
Remote Dummy variable. 0 = Rural but not remote; 1 = Rural 
and remote.3  
0.25 
(0.43) 
0 1 
Household finances in 2008  
Woman’s income   Woman’s annual cash income  4564.42 
(6460.37) 
0 30,000 
Other’s income  Annual cash income earned by members of the 
household other than respondent  
40219.94 
(24909.82) 
0 160,800 
Support-wife  Net annual support given by wife’s maternal relations 8261.66 
(10788.48) 
0 106,000 
Support-husband  Net annual support given by husband’s siblings and 
other relatives  
8589.72 
(11762.29) 
0 100,000 
Woman’s debt  Debt incurred by woman alone  28555.92 
(38539.62) 
0 240,000 
Other’s debt  Debt incurred by members of the household other 
than respondent  
47966.56 
(83765.96) 
0 780,000 
Notes: 1 Land typically belongs to the male head of the household.  
                  2 In rural India, it is common to own the house one lives in. In our sample, ownership of house is 100%, but  
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              like agricultural land, house is also usually in the name of the male head of family.    
                  3 A household was classified as Remote if it took over 30 minutes to reach it by bus.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Loan Types 
Type of 
loan 
Who gives? Typical 
amount 
Typical 
duration 
Interest 
charged 
pm1 
Other 
conditions 
Who takes 
and for what? 
Total  
borrowed 
(% of debt) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Planned loans      3233700 
(69.47)2 
19838.65 
(34089.05) 
Local Elite Wealthy 
persons, 
locally 
influential   
Large 
(>10000) 
Very long 
(sometime
s several 
years) 
High 
(5-10%) 
Repayment 
schedules 
are 
inflexible 
Mainly men, 
but also 
women, for 
productive and 
social 
investments 
179250 
(3.85) 
 
1099.693 
(5087.02) 
Institutional National 
banks and 
subsidiaries 
and private 
institutions 
Large 
(>10000) 
Long 
(usually 1 
to 2 years) 
Medium 
(2-3%) 
Repayments 
are fixed but 
in practice 
can be 
negotiated 
Only men, for 
agricultural 
investment. 
Collateral is 
necessary. 
476500 
(10.24) 
 
2923.313 
(15839.33) 
 
Relatives 
and Friends 
Relations and 
friends who 
may also be 
neighbours  
Medium to 
Large 
(>5000) 
Very long 
(several 
years) 
Low 
(1-2%) 
Fairly 
flexible 
Men and 
women, mainly 
for social and 
religious needs 
278300 
(5.98) 
 
 
1707.362 
(6019.519) 
SHG loans Rural banks Medium to 
Large 
(between 
2500 and 
10000) 
Long Low 
(1-2%) 
Rigorous, 
but 
instalments 
are small 
Only women, 
for both 
consumption 
and productive 
purposes 
2299650 
(49.41) 
 
14108.28 
(26730.47) 
 
Instant loans  1420915 
(30.53) 
8717.27 
(22149.81) 
Kaimathu Neighbours 
and friends 
Small (100 to 
1000 rupees) 
Short (few 
days) 
None 
 
Reciprocity 
is expected 
Mainly women, 
for consumption 
432790 
(9.30) 
2655.153 
(16742.41) 
Thandal Door-to-door 
money 
lenders  
Medium  
(a few 000) 
Medium 
(3 months) 
High 
(10-15%) 
 Mainly women, 
for consumption 
(men may be 
present)  
281000 
(6.04) 
1723.926 
(6082.80) 
 
Shops Shopkeepers  Varies but 
typically 
<1000  
Varies but 
typically a 
few weeks 
Varies, (0-
10%) 
Groceries on 
interest free 
credit 
Only women, for 
consumption 
270125 
(5.80) 
1657.209 
(3577.30) 
 
Pawnbroker  Pawnbroker Jewellery, 
occasionally 
land is pawned 
(1000-10,000) 
Long 
(1 to 2 
years) 
Medium 
(2-3%) 
A piece of 
paper gives   
details of 
exchange 
Mainly women, 
but also men if 
loan amount is 
big, for 
consumption and 
437000 
(9.39) 
 
2680.982 
(8355.68) 
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social investment 
Notes: 1 CPI based average inflation rate in 2008 for rural India was 8.32%  
                  2 As percentage of total debt incurred by the woman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Types of Household Financial Decisions and Examples 
Decision Type Some Typical Decisions 
Routine To buy rice for family; To buy cooking oil; To buy ribbons for hair 
Health  To take a family member to the doctor; To take a child for immunisation; To buy medicines for non-
routine illnesses 
Education To buy school shoes; To buy stationery; To buy school bus pass   
Ceremonies To organise child’s naming ceremony; To organise a communal meal to mark the death anniversary of 
a family elder; To organise a wedding 
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Figure 1. Women's Role in Household Financial Decisions (N=163)  
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Joint 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics across Loan Type (N=163, data from the year 2008) 
Variable Name All Loan Types Planned Loans vs. Instant Loans                      
 ≤ Median 
borrowing  
N=83 
>Median 
borrowing 
N=80 
 p- value1  More  Planned    
N=97 
More Instant 
N=49 
p- value 
Women’s personal characteristics 
Age 34.07 36.70 0.03 35.47 34.96 0.37 
Education 0.88 0.93 0.34 0.92 0.92 0.50 
Children 1.78 1.72 0.30 1.78 1.71 0.31 
Household characteristics 
Family Size  4.84 4.73 0.31 5.01 4.39 0.01 
Dalit 0.57 0.62 0.28 0.52 0.78 0.00 
Joint family 0.30 0.36 0.24 0.38 0.22 0.03 
External ties 8.11 9.32 0.12 7.34 10.69 0.00 
Land 0.45 0.48 0.41 0.58 0.25 0.01 
Housing 2.18 2.00 0.19 2.18 1.82 0.06 
Remote 0.34 0.15 0.00 0.28 0.12 0.02 
Household finances in 2008 
Woman’s income   4034.76 5075.93 0.14 4815.46 4810.20 0.50 
Other’s income  39733.54 40712.35 0.40 43230.41 34922.45 0.03 
Support-wife 7685.37 8845.06 0.25 7491.49 9576.53 0.14 
Support-husband  6793.90 10407.72 0.02 8800.52 9612.24 0.35 
Woman’s debt  6952.93 50425.62 0.00 32580.67 29087.55 0.31 
Other’s debt  49700.00 46211.73 0.40 54911.86 21102.04 0.01 
Note: 1 The probability or the p-value associated with the t-test is reported here. If this p-value is below 5% (0.05) then we 
can conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between the two population means.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Table 5. Regressing Women’s Role in Financial Decisions on Borrowings and Personal Characteristics: Raw 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model 
 Type of Financial Decision 
 Routine Health Education Ceremonies 
Women’s personal characteristics  
Age -0.0197 
(-1.91)* 
0.0059 
(0.55) 
0.0131 
(1.72)* 
0.0045 
(0.43) 
Education  -0.0456 
(-0.31) 
0.0275 
(0.21) 
-0.0148 
(-0.11) 
-0.0875 
(-0.68) 
Number of children 0.1259 
(0.83) 
0.2824 
(2.08)* 
0.1972 
(1.79)* 
0.2903 
(2.29)** 
Household characteristics    
Household size  (log)  
   
-0.2178 
(-2.10)** 
-0.0964 
(-0.98) 
-0.0257 
(-0.27) 
-0.1083 
(-1.15) 
Dalit by caste (d) -0.3460 
(-1.76)* 
-0.5818 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.2986 
(-1.47) 
-0.2516 
(-1.25) 
Joint family (d) 0.0961 
(0.33) 
0.1218 
(0.45) 
0.0435 
(0.16) 
0.0311 
(0.12) 
External ties  0.0359 
(2.66)*** 
0.0032 
(0.25) 
-0.0083 
(-1.67) 
0.0070 
(0.57) 
Housing material -0.0487 
(-0.65) 
-0.0607 
(-0.86) 
-0.0860 
(-1.21) 
-0.0643 
(-0.93) 
Remote location (d) -0.4590 
(-1.97)* 
-0.1046 
(-0.46) 
-0.2168 
(-0.95) 
-0.3936 
(-1.77)* 
Household finances    
Woman’s income (log)  0.00002 
(1.71)* 
0.0004 
(0.99) 
0.0004 
(2.87)*** 
0.0009 
(1.29) 
Other’s income (log) 0.0003 
(0.427) 
0.0005 
(1.46) 
0.0008 
(0.20) 
-0.0000 
(-0.05) 
Support-wife  0.0009 
(1.90)* 
-0.0002 
(-0.29) 
0.0001 
(0.92) 
0.0006 
(0.61) 
Support-husband   0.0009 
(1.58) 
0.0006 
(0.67) 
0.0005 
(0.56) 
0.0007 
(1.66) 
Woman’s borrowing  0.0001 
(0.65) 
0.0002 
(1.92)* 
0.0005 
(2.23)** 
0.0002 
(0.97) 
Other’s borrowing  -0.0001 
(-1.04) 
-0.0000 
(-0.66) 
-0.0001 
(-0.90) 
-0.0000 
(-0.37) 
Observations 163 163 163 163 
Log likelihood =  -173.0521 -198.1367 -195.2506 -188.2965 
Chi2 37.43 23.93 30.41 24.35 
Note: Estimated by ordered probit. Z-statistics in parentheses. (d) indicates a dummy variable. * Significant at 10%;  
** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. Regressing Women’s Role in Financial Decisions on Types of Borrowings and Personal Characteristics:  
Raw Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model  
 Type of Financial Decision 
 Routine Health Education Ceremonies 
Women’s personal characteristics 
Age in years -0.0241 
(-2.15)* 
0.0057 
(0.53) 
0.0077 
(1.70)* 
0.0045 
(0.42) 
Education  -0.0635 
(-0.43) 
0.0199 
(0.15) 
-0.0631 
(-0.47) 
-0.0925 
(-0.72) 
Number of children 0.1218 
(0.79) 
0.2834 
(2.08)* 
0.1889 
(1.73)* 
0.2895 
(2.18)* 
Household characteristics 
Household size  (log) 
   
-0.2116 
(-2.00)* 
-0.0943 
(-0.95) 
-0.0034 
(-0.04) 
-0.1074 
(-1.14) 
Dalit by caste (d) -0.4258 
(-1.97)* 
-0.5979 
( -2.99)*** 
-0.4456 
(-2.14)* 
-0.2567 
(-1.27) 
Joint family (d) 0.1069 
(0.37) 
0.1458 
(0.53) 
0.0609 
(0.22) 
0.0433 
(0.16) 
External ties  0.0249 
(1.99)* 
0.0006 
(0.05) 
-0.0250 
(-1.86)* 
0.0057 
(0.46) 
Housing material -0.0339 
(-0.44) 
-0.0641 
( -0.91) 
-0.0710 
(-0.97) 
-0.0661 
(-0.95) 
Remote location (d) -0.3847 
( -1.64) 
-0.0869 
(-0.38) 
-0.1327 
(-0.57) 
-0.3852 
(-1.68) 
Household finances 
Woman’s income 
(log) 
0.0006 
(1.34) 
0.0002 
( 0.82) 
0.0009 
(2.62)** 
0.0007 
(1.18) 
Other’s income (log) 0.0003 
(0.70) 
0.0006 
( 1.57) 
0.0001 
(0.25) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
Support-wife 0.0006 
(2.13)** 
-0.0005 
(-0.52) 
0.0002 
(0.89) 
0.0004 
(0.48) 
Support-husband   0.0006 
(1.34) 
0.0005 
(0.59) 
0.0002 
(0.29) 
0.0005 
(1.63) 
Woman’s planned 
loans  
-0.0000 
(-0.19) 
0.0000 
(0.26) 
0.0003 
(0.98) 
0.0001 
(0.46) 
Woman’s instant 
loans 
0.0005 
(2.84)*** 
0.0007 
(2.44)** 
0.0004 
(4.10)*** 
0.0004 
(0.93) 
Other’s borrowing  -0.0000 
(-0.32) 
-0.0000 
(-0.45) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
-0.0000 
(-0.28) 
Observations 163 163 163 163 
Log likelihood -168.3541 -197.4284 -186.8630 -188.1066 
Chi2 43.83 42.35 44.19 41.73 
Note: Estimated by ordered probit. Z-statistics in parentheses. (d) indicates a dummy variable. * Significant at  
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10%; **Significant at 5%; ***  Significant at 1%.  
 
Table 7. Effects of Planned loans and Instant loans on Women’s Role in Financial Decisions: Marginal Effects 
from Ordered Probit Models (N=163) 
 Planned Loans Instant Loans 
 No role Joint Alone No role Joint Alone 
Routine 0.0000 
(0.19) 
0.0000 
(0.19) 
-0.0000 
(-0.19) 
-0.0008 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.0004 
(-2.16)** 
0.0008 
(2.92)*** 
Health -0.0000 
(-0.26) 
-0.0000 
(-0.23) 
0.0000 
(0.26) 
-0.0002 
(-1.35) 
-0.0000 
(-0.43) 
0.0002 
(2.34)** 
Education -0.0000 
(-0.98) 
-0.0000 
(-0.63) 
0.0001 
(0.98) 
-0.0004 
(-4.26)*** 
-0.0001 
(-0.78) 
0.0005 
(3.86)*** 
Ceremonies -0.0000 
(-0.46) 
-0.0000 
(-0.37) 
0.0000 
(0.46) 
-0.0001 
(-0.93) 
-0.0000 
(-0.52) 
0.0001 
(0.93) 
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***  Significant at 1%. 
Appendix. Data Collection  
The data collected in 2008 were from the clients of two NGOs operating in two adjoining districts, Vellore and 
Thiruvallur, in the North of Chennai (Tamil Nadu, India). Names of NGOs have been withheld for confidentiality 
reasons. The first NGO (we shall call it NGO A) has been operating since 1990 in the Vellore district, which is 
traditionally agricultural, but where there is an increasing amount of textile and electronic industry. In 2008, NGO A 
dealt with 585 groups, involving 8875 women, in 115 villages. Its target population is exclusively women from low and 
middle castes. The second NGO (we shall call it NGO B) has been operating since the 1980s in the more urbanized 
Thiruvallur district, closer to the main city of Chennai. In 2008, NGO B dealt with 126 groups (about 2142 women). Its 
target population is exclusively women from low castes. The two NGOs currently apply SHG methodology and thus act 
as an intermediary between these groups and external lenders, namely banks, governmental schemes and governmental 
agencies such as the Tamil Nadu Women Development Corporation.  
The following steps were applied for sample stratification: 
1. Classification of all villages attended by the NGOs (based on lists provided by the two NGOs) according to three 
enclosure levels: enclosed rural, intermediate and peri-urban. 
2. For each enclosure level, frequented villages were drawn at random. The weight applied to each enclosure level was 
the same as that observed in the general population (both NGOs’ policy is to have a homogenous coverage in a given 
specific and bounded geographic area). 
3. For each village selected, groups were randomly drawn out (based on the exhaustive list of groups provided by the two 
NGOs).  
4. For each group drawn, members were randomly drawn to be interviewed (based on a list provided by the SHG 
leaders). In Vellore, both middle and low castes are attended by the NGO. Thus women were drawn within each category 
in order to follow the weight of each caste level in the attended population. 
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1 At the same time, borrowing from the local elite is often a source of exploitation and dependency. For more on this see 
Swaminathan, 1991; Harriss-White & Colatei 2004 and Guérin et al. 2013. 
 
2 The design of flexible microfinance products is discussed by Laureti and Hamp (2011) and Labie et al. (2013).  
 
3 The full sample has a total of 170 households. One man and one woman were interviewed from each household. For 
this study, however, we use only the information collected from the women respondents. Furthermore, as we are 
interested in studying the relationship between credit and women’s bargaining power in the household, we excluded 
female-headed households from our analysis.   
 
4 Dalits are former untouchables, classified as Scheduled Caste and belonging to the lowest echelon of social hierarchy in 
rural India. 
 
5 Attempts at including the household’s non-cash income (self-production and payment in kind) were abandoned given 
the paucity of data.  
 
6 In 2008, the official Indian poverty threshold was around 20,000 INR for a five-member family. In fact, this amount is 
underestimated since decent living standards correspond to 50,000 INR.  
 
7 In India, it is quite common to find cash-strapped rural households supported by relatives who have migrated to the 
cities and have better access to cash incomes. This support may be purely altruistic, but is often in exchange for caring 
for farmlands and homesteads left behind and may be reciprocated in the form of agricultural produce.   
 
8 Preceding this categorisation was a process of much trial and error. We began by examining each type of loan 
separately, but it was quickly apparent that this would not give us meaningful results because of missing data and it was 
also difficult to differentiate between loan types using the objective indicators of accessibility and formality. We then 
started merging different types of loans along these indicators and we estimated the results at each step. Loan from 
pawnbrokers was the only loan type that we were unsure of how to categorise because although these loans were 
available instantly, they did require some planning and also involved ‘paperwork’ (usually just a piece of paper stating 
the item pawned and the amount of credit). We decided to keep these loans under ‘instant loans’ because accessibility 
mattered more than formality to the survey households. Our results are robust to how we categorised this loan type.   
 
9 For certain types of instant loans – like pawnbroker loans, male participation may be required depending on the value of 
item being pawned and the distance to the pawnshop. Occasionally men are also seen to borrow from their close circle of 
friends and acquaintances, but this is often at their place of work or outside the village, which has limited implications for 
their status and honour within their community.   
 
10 This observation ties in with our regression results (reported in Table 4). We find that woman’s age has a negative and 
significant influence on women’s role in routine financial decisions, indicating that as women get older they tend to 
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delegate these decisions to other in the household. Our qualitative interviews suggest that the people who pick up these 
decisions are usually younger women in the household.   
 
11 We also compare women who borrow more (median or above) planned loans with women who borrow less of such 
loans (below median) and women who borrow more of instant loans with women who borrow less of such loans. These 
results are compatible with the results reported in Table 4 and are available upon request from the authors.  
 
12 There is a general point about the possibility of omitted variables that must be made here. There may be other variables 
that can influence women’s decision making power that we may not be aware of. Consequently, the results could be 
biased. This is problem that studies examining the determinants of decision-making power suffer from. This issue is 
difficult to address with a cross-sectional analysis without valid instrument(s).  
 
13 The decision making power for a woman can be expected to be correlated across the four decision types. Pooling all 
decision categories or using system regression should help address this issue. Our qualitative fieldwork, however, 
indicates that the importance attached to decisions differs vastly depending on the type of decision. We also find that 
decision making across the decision types are only moderately correlated with coefficients between 0.50 and 0.60.  
14 Note that our results are robust to this assignment. If we consider decision making as a binary variable by pooling joint 
and individual decisions then this does not alter the results in any material way. Robustness tests are available from the 
authors upon request.  
 
15 These summations are also supported by the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, where the coefficient for the variable 
Dalit and Housing Material (proxy for household wealth) is negative in all the regressions.   	
 
16 Women may perform ‘other convenient services’ for the household like housework, work in the field and raise 
children. It is likely that women performing these services may also enjoy a greater say in household decisions. We 
cannot test this idea with our existing field data. While we appreciate this point made by the referee, our understanding of 
rural society in India suggests that these ‘other services’ are considered to be part of a woman’s traditional role and are 
routinely expected from a wife and a mother. On the other hand, accessing credit at very short notice is not traditionally a 
woman’s task and may hence not be viewed similarly to other household tasks and be more deserving of recognition.  
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